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In an agency model this paper studies the strategic eﬀect of diﬀerences in
timing of veriﬁcation. A principal may choose between two equally eﬃcient
veriﬁcation procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the princi-
pal receives additional private information. Because auditing exacerbates the
tension between incentives for eﬀort and veriﬁcation, monitoring is superior if
1) veriﬁcation costs are low such that a high veriﬁcation intensity is desirable,
or if 2) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded
transfers or risk averseness.
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1 Introduction
One of the main internal problems of an organization is the existence of moral haz-
ard. When an employee’s eﬀort or action cannot be observed, his renumeration
cannot be linked to his actual eﬀort decision and room for moral hazard exists. As
is well known, problems of moral hazard place a cost on the organization. Organi-
zations will therefore have reasons to reduce the scope for moral hazard and obtain
more accurate information about the unobservable eﬀort decision through costly
veriﬁcation procedures (e.g. Townsend (1979)). Many aspects of such veriﬁcation
procedures will lie in the hands of the organization itself. It must decide what kind
of information it wants to acquire, when to acquire it, and how to use it.1 The
purpose of this paper is to look into the ”when” of information acquisition, i.e., its
timing.2
More speciﬁcally, in a standard agency setting this paper studies two alterna-
tive procedures of veriﬁcation that I call monitoring and auditing. The diﬀerence
between the two procedures is that monitoring takes place while the agent chooses
his action, while auditing occurs after he has taken his action. This diﬀerence in
timing has a strategic consequence, because after the agent’s decision the principal
receives supplementary information about his actual behavior. Hence, with auditing
the principal’s decision to verify is taken on the basis of additional information that
is not available under monitoring. It is this informational wedge that inﬂuences the
principal’s optimal veriﬁcation procedure.
To focus on the eﬀects which are due to this diﬀerence in timing I assume that
monitoring and auditing concern the veriﬁcation of identical variables and that both
procedures are equally eﬃcient. This modeling allows for two diﬀerent interpreta-
tions. First, the diﬀerence between monitoring and auditing may regard the exact
1Hence, this paper is related to the ”accounting method choice” literature in accounting, which
investigates how organizations choose among competing methods of accounting, e.g. Watts (1979)
and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983). According to Holthausen (1990) there exist three competing
theories towards accounting choice; opportunistic behavior of management, eﬃcient contracting
and informational aspects. This paper takes the eﬃcient contracting perspective that the choice
is driven by eﬃcient contracting.
2Already the original work on moral hazard of Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) considered
the question of how to use available information. Maskin and Riley (1985) and Khalil and Lawarree
(1995) address the ﬁrst question of what kind of information the principal should gather.3
point in time at which the decision to evaluate evidence is taken. For instance, the
principal may decide to observe the agent with video cameras. Monitoring would
then mean that the principal follows the agent’s behavior “live” on a video screen.
Auditing, on the other hand, would mean that the principal collects the recordings
and decides about reviewing them on the basis of some additional information that
comes available after the agent has completed his tasks, e.g. the success of the
project the agent worked on. Second, the physical character of diﬀerent procedures
of veriﬁcation may lead to a natural diﬀerence in timing. For instance, direct su-
pervision of an agent necessarily implies monitoring, whereas checking the agent’s
reports about his actions involves auditing.
Clearly, if the principal can fully commit herself to the implementation of a spe-
ciﬁc veriﬁcation strategy, she can never be worse oﬀ under auditing. With auditing
she can achieve any outcome under monitoring by simply mimicking the monitoring
strategy, i.e., disregarding all intermediate information. The mimicking-strategy,
however, requires that the principal’s veriﬁcation strategy is veriﬁable such that
her commitment to disregard additional information is credible. When such con-
tractual commitment is not feasible, the weak optimality result of auditing may be
overturned.
Indeed, if the principal cannot commit to a veriﬁcation strategy contractually, the
principal’s veriﬁcation behavior becomes a strategic variable that is chosen sequen-
tially rational. A non-commitment to veriﬁcation seems reasonable if the eﬀective-
ness of veriﬁcation depends on an unobservable scrutinizing eﬀort by the principal.
A second reason may be due to the diﬃculty of committing to random veriﬁcation.
As is well known (e.g. Mookherjee and Png (1989)), optimal veriﬁcation procedures
often require a random use of veriﬁcation. Yet, agents and outside courts may ﬁnd
it hard to verify whether the principal did indeed apply the correct random behav-
ior as stipulated by some contract.3 This seems the most realistic reason why the
assumption of non-veriﬁable veriﬁcation makes sense: Many real life contracts do
stipulate the possibility that the agent is being veriﬁed, but do not determine the
actual frequency.4 Such contracts conform to the contractibility assumption in this
3This argument is also used in Khalil (1997).
4In many countries employers are, by law, only allowed to use stochastic veriﬁcation procedures
if they inform the employee explicitly about the possibility of veriﬁcation in advance.4
paper. I.e., the principal binds herself contractually to a veriﬁcation procedure, but
its actual use is left at the principal’s discretion.
The intuition behind the non-trivial trade-oﬀ between monitoring and auditing
is the existence of a natural tension between incentives to the agent to work and to
the principal to verify. To induce high eﬀort from an agent it is well known that the
principal must reward him when there is evidence that he worked. Such a payment
structure, however, implies that the principal has less incentives to verify when she
has some indication that the agent worked. Hence, it becomes more diﬃcult for
the principal to verify with a high intensity, if her decision to verify is based on
additional information. The diﬀerence between monitoring and auditing is exactly
this additional information and the tension between incentives is therefore more
severe under auditing than under monitoring.
For two reasons the diﬃculties in inducing high veriﬁcation intensities under au-
diting may render it suboptimal. First, if veriﬁcation costs are low such that a high
veriﬁcation intensity is desirable, monitoring is optimal, because, for the aforemen-
tioned reason, a high intensity is cheaper to implement under monitoring. Second,
since auditing implies a lower veriﬁcation intensity, the incentive structure to the
agent to induce working must be steeper. If transfers are bounded or the agent
is risk averse, the steeper incentive structure may be impossible or too costly to
implement. Also in this case, monitoring is superior. On the other hand, for rela-
tively high costs of veriﬁcation and a risk neutral agent with unbounded transfers,
auditing is optimal, because it allows the principal to use a more selective form of
veriﬁcation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a
simple model of veriﬁcation. Section 3 derives the optimal contract under monitoring
and Section 4 analyzes the case of auditing. Section 5 compares the optimal contracts
and derives conditions under which monitoring is superior to auditing. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a risk neutral principal who has a project that is run by a risk neutral
agent. The agent chooses to work w or shirk s. If the agent works, the project5
is always successful.5 With shirking the project is only successful with probability
1¡p. A successful project yields the principal a payoﬀ of y. An unsuccessful project
is worthless. Hence, the productive gain when the agent works is ∆y ´ (1 ¡ p)y.
If the agent works he incurs a disutility of e. Shirking is costless to the agent.
The diﬀerence ∆y¡e measures therefore the potential social gain of working versus
shirking. To have a non-trivial problem, we assume that this gain is strictly positive,
i.e., ∆y > e.
The agent’s decision and the success of the project are not veriﬁable. Instead, the
principal may, at a personal cost c < e, verify the agent’s action to detect shirking.
That is, there exists a veriﬁable signal ¾ 2 fw;sg about the agent’s action whose
informative content depends on a veriﬁcation eﬀort of the principal. The principal’s
eﬀort is binary; she either veriﬁes actively and incurs the cost c or she does not
verify. Active veriﬁcation reveals a shirking agent perfectly. If the principal does
not verify actively, she cannot detect shirking and the signal ¾ always reports ¾ = w.
The principal and agent write a contract t that stipulates transfers from the
principal to the agent. Since only the signal ¾ about the action is veriﬁable, a
general contract of transfers is simply a combination (tw;ts). The agent is protected
by a limited liability of zero. The maximum transfer that the principal can promise
is also bounded by ¯ t ¸ e.6 Hence, a feasible contract requires tw;ts 2 [0;¯ t]. Due
to the simple contractual structure the diﬀerence ∆t ´ tw ¡ ts is a straightforward
measure of the steepness of the agent’s incentive structure. Limited liability implies
that the steepness of the incentive structure is at most ¯ t. Finally, the agent’s outside
option is zero.
Before oﬀering a contract to the agent the principal commits to one of the two
veriﬁcation procedures auditing or monitoring. If the principal adopts monitoring,
she chooses her veriﬁcation eﬀort before knowing the agent’s action and the timing
is as follows:
1. Principal oﬀers a contract.
2. Agent decides whether to accept the contract.
5Qualitative results remain unchanged when the probability of success is smaller but close to
one. The assumption increases tractability and eases the exposition.
6Clearly, if ¯ t < e, the agent cannot be compensated for his eﬀort cost e.6
3. Agent and principal decide simultaneously about action and veriﬁcation eﬀort
respectively.
Hence, under monitoring the agent and principal play a simple simultaneous
move game. In contrast, the principal and the agent play a sequential game under
auditing. The agent chooses ﬁrst his action, after which the principal observes the
output. Only then she chooses whether to verify:
1. Principal oﬀers a contract.
2. Agent decides whether to accept the contract.
3. Agent chooses his action.
4. Principal observes the output and chooses veriﬁcation eﬀort.
The game with auditing is more complicated, in that the principal takes her
decision under asymmetric information. Hence, whereas with monitoring we may
solve the subgame in stage 3 as a straightforward Nash equilibrium, the appropriate
equilibrium concept in the game with auditing is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
3 Monitoring
First suppose the principal uses monitoring as her procedure of veriﬁcation. Clearly,
if the principal does not monitor actively, the agent will shirk, since without veriﬁ-
cation his renumeration is independent of his actual action. Hence, if the principal
wants to induce the agent to work, she must verify actively. Indeed, if the principal
monitors with probability ° the agent receives a net utility of °tw +(1¡°)tw ¡e if
he works. Shirking on the other hand, yields the agent °ts + (1 ¡ °)tw. Hence, the
agent has a weak incentive to work if
∆t ¸ e=°: (1)
The inequality represents the agent’s incentive constraint. It shows that the re-
quired steepness of the incentive structure, ∆t, is inversely related to the principal’s
monitoring intensity °. Indeed, if ° approaches zero, the required wedge ∆t goes to
inﬁnity. It reﬂects the observation that at least some active veriﬁcation has to occur
to induce the agent to work.7
An inducement of working requires active veriﬁcation by the principal. Yet,
because veriﬁcation is not contractible, the contract (tw;ts) must give the principal
genuine incentives to monitor. Given that the agent works, the principal pays tw+c
if she decides to monitor. If she, on the other hand, does not verify, she pays tw.
Hence, given that the agent worked, the principal will not monitor. Consequently,
there is no equilibrium in which the agent works with probability one.
Now suppose the agent chooses to work with a probability ® less than one.7
This requires that the agent is indiﬀerent between working and shirking. That is,
the agent’s incentive constraint (1) must hold in equality:
∆t = e=°: (2)
If the principal monitors, she expects to pay ®tw + (1 ¡ ®)ts + c, whereas she pays





Inequality (3) represents the principal’s incentive constraint to monitor actively. It
conﬁrms the former observation that the principal cannot be given incentives to
monitor if the agent works with probability one, as the required wedge ∆t goes
to inﬁnity when ® goes to one. Furthermore, combining the constraint with the
incentive constraint (2) of the agent reveals that the minimum steepness of incentives
to induce working is ∆t = e and induces the agent to work with probability 1¡c=e,
while the principal monitors with probability one.
The incentive constraints (2) and (3) describe the implementation restrictions
due to asymmetric information. In addition to these constraints, the contract must
ensure participation of the agent. That is, ensure the agent a non-negative utility.
Yet, because the agent is protected by a limited liability of zero and shirking is
costless, any admissible contract yields the agent a non-negative payoﬀ if he chooses
to shirk. Hence, any incentive compatible contract that satisﬁes limited liability
ensures the agent at least his reservation utility of zero. Hence, one may disregard
the agent’s individual rationality constraint and it follows that the optimal contract
7Throughout the paper we assume that optimal contracts induce a strictly positive working
intensity ®.8
is the solution to the following problem
P1 : max
tw;ts;°;® Vp = (® + (1 ¡ ®)p)y ¡ ®tw ¡ (1 ¡ ®)[°ts + (1 ¡ °)tw] ¡ °c
s.t. (1 ¡ °)(∆t ¡ c=(1 ¡ ®)) = 0 (4)
(2) and (3);
where the constraint (4) guarantees that the principal is indiﬀerent about monitor-
ing, if she monitors with a probability less than one.
Proposition 1 Under monitoring the optimal contract is (tw;ts) = (t¤
w;0) and
yields the principal V ¤
1 . It induces the agent to work with probability ® = 1 ¡ c=t¤
w








e if c < e2=∆y
p
c∆y if c 2 [e2=∆y;¯ t2=∆y]







y ¡ e ¡ c∆y=e if c < e2=∆y
y ¡ 2
p
c∆y if c 2 [e2=∆y;¯ t2=∆y]
y ¡ ¯ t ¡ c∆y=¯ t if c > ¯ t2=∆y:
The proposition shows that the maximum punishment principle holds. That is, it
is optimal to set ts to its minimum of zero. An intuitive result as the transfer ts is only
paid, when it is veriﬁed that the project failed and the agent shirked. On the other
hand, the optimal level of tw depends on the cost of veriﬁcation c. If monitoring costs
are relatively small, the principal chooses tw such that she monitors with probability
1. For larger monitoring costs it is optimal for the principal to monitor with a
probability less than one. Since t¤
w is increasing in c, the monitoring intensity is
decreasing in the cost of veriﬁcation c. This intuitive feature of the optimal contract
will play an important role when comparing monitoring to auditing. Finally, the
maximum allowable transfer ¯ t restricts the principal only if it is relatively small.
4 Auditing
Now suppose the principal chooses auditing as her procedure of veriﬁcation. In
this case the principal decides about active veriﬁcation after observing the project’s
outcome. Hence, she may audit failed and successful projects with diﬀerent in-
tensities. Suppose the principal audits successful project with probability °s and9
failures with probability °f. To induce the agent to work with positive prob-
ability, the decision to work must yield the agent at least as much as shirking.
Given the principal’s auditing intensities °f and °s, the agent receives a utility of
p(°sts + (1 ¡ °s)tw) + (1 ¡ p)(°fts + (1 ¡ °f)tw) when he shirks. Working, on the




°sp + °f(1 ¡ p)
: (5)
Constraint (5) represents the agent’s incentive constraint under auditing. It shows
that at least some auditing must take place, if the agent is to work with positive
probability.
Like in the previous section, the principal’s auditing behavior is guided by the
contract t and, in addition, her belief about the agent’s behavior. More precisely,
given that the principal believes that the agent worked with probability !, she has
a weak incentive to audit if
!tw + (1 ¡ !)ts + c · tw:
The principal’s belief ! depends on the outcome of the project. If the principal
observes a failure, this can only have come, because the agent shirked. Hence,
!f = 0 and the principal has a (weak) incentive to audit a failed project, if
∆t ¸ c: (6)
On the other hand, if the principal observes a successful project, the agent either
worked or shirked, but was lucky. Given that the agent works with probability ®
the probability that the agent worked follows from Bayes’ rule:
!s =
®
® + (1 ¡ ®)p
:









Eﬀectively, constraint (6) and (7) imply that the principal may choose between
two basic auditing strategies. Either she only audits failed projects, or she audits
both successful and failed projects. Quite intuitively, the principal cannot induce
herself to audit only successful project, because constraint (7) is stricter than (6).
Hence, an exclusive auditing of failed projects requires less costly incentives than if
the principal is to audit also successful projects. Moreover, the constraints show that,
in equilibrium, the auditing intensities °f and °s are interdependent. If the principal
audits successful projects with a positive probability, then she must audit failed
project with probability one. Alternatively, if the principal audits failed projects
with a probability less than one, she does not audit successful projects.
We may use the interdependence to simplify the agent’s incentive constraint (5).
If the principal audits failed projects with a probability less than one (°f < 1), she






In contrast, if the principal audits successful projects with a probability °s > 0,
the principal audits failed project with certainty, i.e., °f = 1. Moreover, it requires
that inequality (7) must be satisﬁed such that ® < 1. That is, if in equilibrium
the principal audits also successful projects, the agent has to shirk with positive
probability and must, therefore, be indiﬀerent between working and shirking. Con-
sequently, the incentive constraint (5) rewrites as
∆t =
e
1 ¡ (1 ¡ °s)p
: (9)
Whether the principal chooses a contract that induces her to audit only failed
projects or also successful projects depends on which type of contract yields the
highest utility. The optimal contract under the exclusive auditing of failed projects
is the solution to the following problem.8
P2 : max
tw;ts;°f;® V2 = (® + (1 ¡ ®)p)(y ¡ tw) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ p)(°fts + (1 ¡ °f)tw + c°f)
s.t. (1 ¡ °f)[∆t ¡ c] = 0; (1 ¡ ®)[∆t ¡ e=(°f(1 ¡ p))] = 0 (10)
(6) and (8);
8Again any incentive compatible contract satisfying limited liability is automatically individual
rational to the agent.11
where the constraints in (10) guarantee that the principal or agent is indiﬀerent if
she or he uses a mixed strategy.
In contrast, the optimal contract that induces the principal to audit both suc-
cessful and failed projects is the solution to the following problem:
P3 : max
tw;ts;°s;® V3 = (® + (1 ¡ ®)p)y ¡ ®(tw + °sc) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p((1 ¡ °s)tw + °sts + °sc)
¡(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ p)(ts + c)
s.t. (1 ¡ °s)[c(1 + ®=(p(1 ¡ ®))] = 0 (11)
(7) and (9);
where equality (11) guarantees that the principal is indiﬀerent about auditing a
successful project if she is to audit such projects with a probability less than one.
In the remainder of this section we solve the two problems and state the optimal
contracts.
Proposition 2 An optimal contract that induces the principal to audit only failed
projects exists only if ¯ t ¸ e=(1¡p). It exhibits t¤
w = e=(1¡p) and t¤
s = 0 and induces
the principal to audit failed projects with probability one and the agent to work with
probability one. It yields the principal V ¤
2 = y ¡ e=(1 ¡ p).
The proposition shows that a contract which induces the principal to audit only
failed projects may not exist. This observation follows directly from the agent’s
incentive constraint (8). Indeed, given that the principal audits only failed projects,
the agent’s shirking is identiﬁed only if the project fails. Hence, under an exclusive
auditing of failed project, the detection probability of shirking is at most 1¡p. This
reveals the disadvantage that an exclusive auditing of failed projects leads necessarily
to a low detection probability and therefore requires high powered incentives for the
agent. Such high powered incentives are possible only if the maximum allowable
payment ¯ t is large enough. Only in this case an optimal contract exists. It induces
the agent to work with probability one and the principal to audit failed projects
with probability one.12
Before we derive the optimal contract that induces the principal to audit also
successful projects deﬁne
ˆ twf ´
(1 ¡ p)c +
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py)
p
:
Proposition 3 The optimal contract that induces the principal to audit failed and
successful projects is (tw;ts) = (t¤
wf;0). It yields the principal V ¤
3 and induces the
agent to work with probability ® = p(tw) ¡ c=[p(tw ¡ c) ¡ c] and the principal to
audit failed project with probability one and successful projects with probability °f =







minfˆ twf;e=(1 ¡ p);¯ tg if ˆ twf ¸ e:






> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
¯ tp(y¡¯ t)¡c2(1¡p)
(1¡p)c+¯ tp if ˆ twf > ¯ t and ¯ t < e=(1 ¡ p)
ep(y(1¡p)¡e)¡c2(1¡p)3





p if ˆ twf 2 [e;¯ t]
ep(y¡e)¡c2(1¡p)
(1¡p)c+ep if ˆ twf < e:
The proposition shows that the optimal contract that gives the principal incen-
tives to audit both failed and successful projects has more in common with the
optimal contract under monitoring than with the ﬁrst type of contract under au-
diting. First, the contract exists for any ¯ t ¸ e. Second, the veriﬁcation probability
in equilibrium is decreasing in the cost of veriﬁcation c. Under this type of con-
tract the principal is also able to induce veriﬁcation with certainty when she sets
(tw;ts) = (e;0). In the next section we compare the contracts more thoroughly.
5 Monitoring versus Auditing
In the previous two sections we derived the optimal contracts under monitoring
and auditing. In this section we compare the three diﬀerent types of contracts.
Comparing the optimal contract under monitoring to the optimal contract that
gives the principal incentives to audit both failed and successful projects yields the
following result.13
Proposition 4 It holds V ¤
1 ¸ V ¤
3 .
The proposition establishes the superiority of monitoring over an auditing of
failed and successful projects. The intuition behind the proposition may be gained
from comparing the incentive constraints of the principal under the two forms of
veriﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the constraint (2) is weaker than the constraint (9) and
implies that the inducement of a working intensity ® requires lower powered incen-
tives under monitoring. Since the maximum punishment principle holds this implies
that for a given working intensity ® the principal must, under the auditing from
failed and successful project, pay the agent more than under monitoring.
Because for ¯ t < e=(1 ¡ p) the only contract that induces the agent to work
induces the principal to audit failed and successful project the proposition has a
straightforward corollary.
Corollary 1 Monitoring is strictly better than auditing if ¯ t < e=(1 ¡ p).
Hence, if the maximum payment ¯ t is relatively low, the principal prefers mon-
itoring over auditing. The corollary follows directly due to exogenously bounded
transfers. Yet, the result should be interpreted in a broader way. The upshot of
the corollary is that if auditing is to be better than monitoring then, according to
Proposition 4, only with a contract that induces an exclusive auditing from failed
projects. But if such contracts are to induce the agent to work, then it requires a
steeper incentive scheme than under monitoring. Hence, auditing can only be better
than monitoring if the implementation of steep incentives is not too costly. Limited
transfers are an extreme, but convenient way of introducing a cost to steeper incen-
tives. It renders the cost of a steep incentive structure inﬁnitely costly. Yet, since
a steeper incentive structure implies more risk, steeper incentive structures would
also be costly if the agent is risk averse. That is, if transfers are unlimited but the
agent is rather risk averse then auditing is inferior to monitoring, because the cost of
compensating the agent for his increased risk will outweigh the gain from a selective
auditing of failed projects. Indeed, one may see boundedness of transfers as a rather
extreme type of risk averseness. Instead of assuming that wages cannot exceed ¯ t,
one may assume that the agent has a utility of u(t) = minft;¯ tg for positive transfers
t ¸ 0. That is, the agent is risk neutral in the interval [0;¯ t] and inﬁnitely risk averse
for wages exceeding ¯ t and 0.14
Proposition 5 Suppose the maximum transfer is unbounded then monitoring is










The proposition shows that if the cost of veriﬁcation is relatively small the prin-
cipal is better oﬀ under monitoring than auditing. Indeed, with small costs of
veriﬁcation the principal wants to verify relatively often. Yet, under an exclusive
auditing of failed projects the auditing intensity is at most 1 ¡ p. Hence, high
auditing intensities require that the principal audits also successful projects. Yet,
according to Proposition 4 these contracts yield the principal less than the optimal
contract under monitoring.










This proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 5. It states that if the cost of
veriﬁcation is relatively high and steep incentives are possible, the principal’s optimal
veriﬁcation strategy is to use auditing and audit only failed projects. Higher costs of
veriﬁcation make veriﬁcation a less attractive option and renders a selective auditing
of failed projects optimal. Hence, if such a selective veriﬁcation is possible, that is,
if ¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p), then auditing is optimal.
6 Conclusion and Final Remarks
This paper studied the strategic eﬀect of a diﬀerence in the timing of veriﬁcation.
It showed that when the principal’s veriﬁcation behavior is non-contractible, moni-
toring may be optimal, as for two reasons the additional information received under
auditing may hurt the principal. First, the additional information makes it more
diﬃcult to verify with a high intensity. Hence, if veriﬁcation costs are low such that15
a high veriﬁcation intensity is in principle attractive, it may be optimal for the prin-
cipal to refrain from obtaining the extra information and use monitoring rather than
auditing. It follows that auditing can only be optimal if a low veriﬁcation intensity is
required. Yet, a second disadvantage of auditing is that it requires steeper incentives
for the agent. Hence, if the implementation of steep incentives is, due to bounded
transfers, not possible, or, due to risk aversion, costly to implement, monitoring
may again turn out to be optimal. Ultimately, the optimality of monitoring is due
to a natural tension between the principal’s incentives to verify and the incentives
for the agent which auditing exacerbates. Indeed, by switching to monitoring as her
procedure of veriﬁcation the principal relaxes the tension. Hence, monitoring may
be seen as a commitment device not to act on the additional information.
The paper assumed that the additional information that the principal receives
under auditing is the agent’s actual output. This is a convenient modeling assump-
tion. Yet, the paper’s results hold for other informative signals. As soon as the ad-
ditional information is informative about the agent’s action, it worsens the tension
between the two incentives. Hence, preventing oneself from receiving the informa-
tion, i.e., choosing monitoring rather than auditing, may be an optimal strategy for
the principal.
Since the diﬀerence between monitoring and auditing is only the additional in-
formation, our results also shed light on the value of information to the principal.
More precisely, only if veriﬁcation costs are low and steep incentives are not too
costly to implement the information has a positive value to the principal. In this
case, the diﬀerence V ¤
2 ¡ V ¤
1 expresses the value of information and represents the
principal’s maximum willingness to pay for the information.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: We solve problem P1 by disregarding (4), as the solution of the relaxed prob-
lem automatically satisﬁes the constraint. Substitution of (2) yields the simpliﬁed
problem
max
ts;°;® V = (® + (1 ¡ ®)p)y ¡ ts ¡ (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)°)e=° ¡ °c16
s.t. ® ¸ 1 ¡ c°=e
with tw = ts + e=°. Since the constraint is independent of ts and the objective
constraint is decreasing in ts, optimality requires ts = 0. Moreover, assuming that
the remaining constraint is not binding leads to a contradiction: If it does not
bind, the objective function is linear in ®, and, since, by assumption, ® > 0 is
optimal, linearity implies that ® = 1 is optimal. Yet, this violates the constraint.
Consequently, the maximization problem can be reduced to
max
tw




which is concave in tw as the 2nd derivative w.r.t. tw is ¡2(1¡p)cy=t3
w. Hence, the




If ˆ tw > ¯ t then optimally t¤
w = ¯ t. Otherwise, t¤
w = maxfe;ˆ twg. Note: ˆ tw ¸ e ,
(1 ¡ p)cy ¸ e2. Finally note that since inequality (3) is binding at the optimum,
the constraint (4) is automatically satisﬁed and there is no loss of generality in
disregarding it.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: From (8), °f · 1, and ts ¸ 0 it follows that tw ¸ e=(1 ¡ p). But since
tw · ¯ t, a necessary condition for the existence of a contract that induces the agent
to work is ¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p).
Therefore suppose ¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p) then constraint (10) implies that either ® = 1
or (8) is binding. First suppose (8) is slack such that ® = 1. The maximization




and yields tw = 0 as an optimum. Yet, for any ts ¸ 0 this violates (8). Consequently,
(8) must be binding at the optimum, which implies that (10) is automatically satis-
ﬁed and may be disregarded. Substitution of a binding (8) reduces the maximization
problem to
max
ts;® (® + (1 ¡ ®)p)(y ¡ e=(1 ¡ p) ¡ ts) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ p)(ts + c)17
the objective function is linearly decreasing in ts and linearly increasing in ®. Hence
® = 1 and ts = 0 is optimal such that t¤
w = e=(1¡p) and V ¤
2 = y¡e=(1¡p). Hence,
¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p) is suﬃcient for existence.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: We solve problem P3 by ﬁrst assuming that (11) is satisﬁed. Substitution
of the solution of (9) with respect to tw yields
V3 = (®+(1¡®)p)y¡c(1¡(1¡®)(1¡°s)p¡®(1¡°s))¡
(® + (1 ¡ °s)(1 ¡ ®)p)e
1 ¡ (1 ¡ °s)p
¡ts;
and shows that V3 is decreasing in ts. Hence, optimality requires ts = 0. Moreover,
since V3 is linear in ® and, by assumption, ® > 0 is optimal, it follows that (7)
must bind at the optimum. This implies that (11) is automatically satisﬁed. Hence,
our starting assumption that (11) is satisﬁed was without loss of generality. A
substitution of the solution of (9) with respect to °s and the solution of (7) with




ptw(y ¡ tw) ¡ c2(1 ¡ p)
ptw + (1 ¡ p)c
; (12)




(1 ¡ p)c(c + py) ¡ (1 ¡ p)c
p
:
Since the 2nd derivative w.r.t. tw at ˆ t3w is ¡2p=
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py) < 0 the ﬁrst order
condition is suﬃcient if it satisﬁes the domain restrictions. I.e., t¤
w = ˆ t3w is optimal
if ˆ t3w 2 [e;minfe=(1 ¡ p);¯ tg]. Now if ˆ t3w < e then t¤
w = e is optimal. On the other
hand, if ˆ t3w > minfe=(1¡p);¯ tg then optimality requires t¤
w = minfe=(1¡p);¯ tg. For





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
¯ tp(y¡¯ t)¡c2(1¡p)
(1¡p)c+¯ tp if ˆ twf > ¯ t and ¯ t < e=(1 ¡ p)
ep(y(1¡p)¡e)¡c2(1¡p)3





p if ˆ twf 2 [e;minfe=(1 ¡ p);¯ tg]
ep(y¡e)¡c2(1¡p)
(1¡p)c+ep if ˆ twf < e:18
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: We must show that V ¤
1 ¸ V ¤








Proposition 3 implies V ¤
3 · ˆ V ¤
3 ´ y ¡ (2
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py)2(1 ¡ p)c)=p. It holds
V
¤











That the term in the square bracket is non-negative, follows from the following
argument:
p
2(c ¡ (1 ¡ p)y)
2 ¸ 0 ) (c + py + (1 ¡ p)c ¡ p
2y)
2 ¸ 4(1 ¡ p)c(c + py)
) c + py + (1 ¡ p)c ¡ p
2y ¸ 2
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py)
) c + py + (1 ¡ p)c ¡ 2
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py) ¸ p
2y
) (1 ¡ p)c
·
(c + py) + (1 ¡ p)c ¡ 2
q
(1 ¡ p)c(c + py)
¸









(1 ¡ p)cy < e it holds V ¤
1 = y ¡ e ¡ (1 ¡ p)yc=e and V ¤
3 2 fV3(tw)jtw 2
[e;e=(1¡p)]g with V3(tw) as deﬁned by (12). But for any tw 2 [e;e=(1¡p)] it holds
V
¤







[etw ¡ c(1 ¡ p)y]+c(1 ¡ p)(e ¡ c)
¸0
z }| {
[(1 ¡ p)y ¡ e]








(1 ¡ p)cy > ¯ t then V ¤
1 = y ¡ ¯ t ¡ (1 ¡ p)cy=¯ t. Due to c < e < y(1 ¡ p)
it holds twf >
q
(1 ¡ p)cy > ¯ t. Therefore, twf exceeds ¯ t which implies V ¤
3 · ¯ V ¤
3 =
(¯ tp(y ¡ ¯ t) ¡ c2(1 ¡ p))=((1 ¡ p)c + ¯ tp). It follows that
V
¤
1 ¡ ¯ V
¤
3 =
c(1 ¡ p)(¯ t ¡ c)[(1 ¡ p)y ¡ ¯ t]
¯ t(c + p(¯ t ¡ c))
> 0:
The inequality holds, because from
q
(1 ¡ p)cy > ¯ t and ¯ t > c it follows (1 ¡ p)y >
¯ t2=c > ¯ t.19
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: If the maximum transfer ¯ t is unbounded, then V ¤
2 = y ¡ e=(1 ¡ p).
For (1 ¡ p)cy ¸ e2 it follows that V ¤
1 = y ¡ 2
q
c(1 ¡ p)y and V ¤
1 ¡ V ¤
2 = e=(1 ¡
p) ¡ 2
q
c(1 ¡ p)y. Hence, due to c < e2=[4(1 ¡ p)3y] it holds V ¤
1 > V ¤
2 .
For (1¡p)cy < e2 it follows V ¤
1 = y¡e¡(1¡p)yc=e and due to c < e2p=[(1¡p)2y]
it holds V ¤
1 > V ¤
2 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof: If ¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p), then V ¤
2 = y ¡ e=(1 ¡ p).
For (1 ¡ p)cy ¸ ¯ t2 it follows that V ¤






¯ t((1 ¡ p)¯ t ¡ e) + (1 ¡ p)2yc
(1 ¡ p)¯ t
which is positive, due to ¯ t ¸ e=(1 ¡ p).
For (1 ¡ p)cy 2 (e2;¯ t2) it follows that V ¤
1 = y ¡ 2
q
c(1 ¡ p)y and V ¤
1 ¡ V ¤
2 =
e=(1 ¡ p) ¡ 2
q
c(1 ¡ p)y. Hence, if c > e2=[4(1 ¡ p)3y] then V ¤
2 > V ¤
1 .
For (1¡p)cy < e2 it follows V ¤
1 = y¡e¡(1¡p)yc=e and due to c > e2p=[(1¡p)2y]
it holds V ¤
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